Оn the ideological basis of the elimination of religious extremism, both in general and in relation to the tasks of penitentiary psychology

Preventing the spread of extremism, both in the country as a whole and in the institutions of the penal system of the Russian Federation, is an important and urgent task.

This work is devoted to religious extremism, and first of all, within the framework of the penitentiary system. Already in 2015, scientific, methodological and practical recommendations were developed for the educational departments of institutions and bodies of the Criminal Justice System of Russia on the prevention of religious extremism in penitentiary institutions

The basis of religious extremism is the instillation of false ideas-viruses in the involved victims that acts of extremism (terrorism) can be pleasing to God. As long as the adherent of an extremist organization believes in this, external pressure of any force is ineffective: how can you frighten a person who is morally ready to blow himself and others up "for the glory of God"?

Therefore, the question of what is the essence of any world religion (including, of course, Islam) in our opinion is the key to effective psychological and educational work to prevent religious extremism. This kind of work can only be effective if the penitentiary psychologist himself understands the essence of the matter: what exactly is the basis of the ideological distortion that leads the neophyte to the ideology of religious extremism?

Let us consider possible interpretations of the social essence and meaning of religion in general.

The institution of religion serves (or at least should serve, ideally) to strengthen the connection between man and God. How does this connection manifest itself? In the context of our topic, two fundamentally different interpretations are possible:

A) In our opinion, a person's connection with God is expressed by a moral feeling (the voice of conscience). M. Gandhi said on this matter, “religion and morality are synonymous”

Moral feeling is a feeling of unity with some system of a higher level than the individual: family, society, and ultimately with the whole world and the First Cause of the world (God). In our opinion, this is not a rational superstructure over instincts, but the same primary reality as the instinct of self-preservation (egoism): Morality of biological origin lies within the framework of the unconscious, within the framework of instincts formed by natural evolution in the process of a brutal struggle for existence. Ethical norms of behavior in human society pursue completely different goals, are based on conscious behavior from the position of free will or freedom of choice. In a socially developed, sufficiently cultured human society, codes of rules, laws and moral climate were not formed on the basis of behavioral instincts of higher animals, but were formed essentially anew on the basis of developed personal consciousness and correlation of oneself, one’s “I” with other

It is important to note that morality cannot be reduced not only to instincts, but also to reason. The impossibility of deducing ethical norms from facts was pointed out by D. Hume (the “Hume principle”, which is also called “Hume’s guillotine” due to its obvious destructiveness for attempts at rational justification of morality). Here is an explication of Hume’s principle given by A. Poincaré: “There can be no scientific morality... the reason, so to speak, is purely grammatical. If the premises of a syllogism are both in the indicative mood, then the conclusion will be equally in the indicative mood. In order for the conclusion to be put in the imperative mood, it is necessary that at least one of the premises be in the imperative mood. The principles of science, the postulates of geometry, are expressed only in the indicative mood... the dialectician can juggle with these principles as much as he likes, combine them, pile them on top of each other; everything he gets from them will be in the indicative mood. He will never receive a proposal … that would correspond or contradict morality. … we cannot base morality on the interests of society, on the concept of homeland, on altruism, because the necessity of devoting oneself to society in case of need remains unproven… any morality with proofs is doomed to certain failure in advance; it is like a machine where there is only transmission of motion and no driving energy. The moral engine… can only be feeling”

Then religions are nothing more than ethical-ontological hypotheses explaining moral feeling (and religious feeling is identical to moral feeling — it is its highest manifestation). Therefore, although specific religious myths and dogmas of religions are very different, the moral commandments of world religions are practically the same. "When comparing the moral teachings of highly developed religions, it turns out that they repeat the same core of morality. ... The core of morality can be generalized in three categories: in the duty of respect in relation to the authority of commandments and prohibitions, in duties regarding truth and contracts, and in social duties"

Accordingly, a moral (altruistic) attitude towards people is a step (or even a foundation) on the path to finding love for God. If this is precisely what we see as the meaning of religion, then different religions can peacefully coexist (like, for example, Orthodoxy and Islam in the history of Russia), because they essentially have one goal. If this meaning is forgotten (not understood), then the form (rites, dogmas) becomes the main thing, which leads to a conflictual division, the limit of which is religious wars.

B) An alternative interpretation of the relationship between religious feeling (love for God) and morality is also possible: as, perhaps, related, but essentially different phenomena. In this case, religious feeling is considered primary, and morality is considered a derivative, secondary phenomenon. From this feeling of the ontological gap between the earthly and the heavenly, the idea of the absence of any independent value of earthly life (both one’s own and that of other people) arises. Here is a typical example of a position of this kind: “It will never be better for everyone. Some will be better off, others will be worse off… everything here must perish! And so, what is the point of this feverish concern for the earthly welfare of future generations?”

In our opinion, the ideological basis of any form of religious extremism is the interpretation of religion in the spirit of (B). And the tasks of counteracting religious extremism correspond to interpretation (A). In our opinion, it is the ideological basis for the elimination of religious extremism, both in general (as a destructive social phenomenon) and in relation to the system of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia. As shown earlier, this position corresponds to what is often called the “Russian idea” in philosophical discussions (see in more detail: